On October 17, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, speaking during a press conference at the European Council Summit in Brussels, claimed that 10,000 North Korean troops are ready to be deployed to support Russia in its fight against his country.
In the next few days, Ukrainian and South Korean governments provided evidence of the deployment. The Ukrainian spy agency released a video of North Korean soldiers waiting in line to receive military uniforms, purportedly showing their presence in a Russian military camp along with a North Korean-written document about uniform size. Confirming Zelenskyy’s assertion, South Korea’s intelligence agency announced that 12,000 North Korean troops, including 1,500 special forces, are planned to be deployed. It provided satellite imagery as confirmation.
Following the evidence, on October 21, South Korea’s First Deputy National Security Adviser Kim Tae-hyo demanded North Korea’s immediate withdrawal from Russia. Otherwise, he warned that South Korea could send weapons to Ukraine in a “phased response,” starting with defensive and potentially escalating to offensive weapons.
“We will not sit idly by in the face of further military collusion between North Korea and Russia, and will move to resolutely oppose it in coordination with the international community,” Kim said.
The possibility of South Korea sending weapons to Ukraine intensified following President Yoon Suk-yeoll’s statement on October 24.
In contrast to their security partners, the United States and NATO have maintained a cautious stance regarding the recent claims of North Korean troop deployments to Ukraine. On October 18, immediately following Zelenskyy’s claim, U.S. Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin said that he was concerned about the possibility but could not confirm the deployment; NATO’s Secretary General Mark Rutte also did not confirm it.
On October 23, Austin said North Korean troops had been sent to Russian territory, not the battlefield. He added that their roles are still in question. NATO has taken a similar stance.
So far, North Korea and Russia have denied the deployment claims. North Korean Ambassador to the United Nations Kim Sung condemned them as groundless rumors. Russian Foreign Ministry spokesperson Maria Zakharova called the claims “fake and exaggerated information.” Last week, Russian Ambassador to South Korea Georgy Zinoviev even said that North Korea-Russia cooperation is not against South Korea’s security interests.
Given these developments, South Korea should not rush into a decision to become involved in the Russia-Ukraine conflict. The South Korean government should take time to comprehensively analyze and understand the intelligence information, the security landscape, and potential consequences on the Korean Peninsula. There are four significant factors to consider before sending weapons to Ukraine.
First, the South Korean government should reevaluate the evidence from its spy agency and Ukraine. Following the outbreak of the Russo-Ukrainian war, the United States and NATO, with their advanced reconnaissance assets and analysis capabilities, have shared significant intelligence to support Ukraine.
South Korea too relies on U.S. intelligence assets through U.S. spy satellites and planes. Once data is received from these assets, South Korea and the U.S. cooperate to analyze and interpret it. Afterward, they deliver the analyzed information to the South Korean spy agency. Despite this usual structure, the South Korean government seemed to prioritize its spy agency’s conclusion rather than that of its Defense Ministry, which declined to confirm the deployment.
Second, South Korea needs more time to identify the purpose of the deployed North Korean personnel. Historically, North Korean soldiers were sent to assist African nations and North Vietnam during the Cold War. While this history suggests North Korea’s willingness to deploy military personnel abroad, the current evidence is still insufficient to determine whether the North Koreans in Russia are combat fighters, military engineers, or civilian engineers.
Even if North Korea sent combat fighters, questions still remain regarding the actual impact for the security landscape of the Korean Peninsula. Having designated South Korea as a hostile state in its updated constitution, North Korea has demolished inter-Korean roads and railroads and is building border walls across the Demilitarized Zone in an effort to enhance its defense capabilities. Against that backdrop, we would expect that North Korea combat fighters, particularly the special forces, should remain in the country to protect Kim Jong Un regime. North Korea’s defense capabilities would be weakened by a significant troop deployment to Russia or Ukraine. By the same token, South Korea’s plan of sending weapons, whether defensive or offensive, to Ukraine would impact Seoul’s readiness and conventional deterrence against North Korea.
The third reason for caution is that interoperability between North Korea and Russia is not fully developed. North Korea has not conducted joint military exercises with Russia since the end of the Korean War in the 1950s. For North Korea’s military activities to actually be effective on the battlefield in Ukraine, efforts to integrate command and control, communication, and military terms and languages would need to be made between them. Given this, sending North Korean soldiers to the battlefield could become a strategic disadvantage rather than a benefit for Russia.
Fourth, the legal grounds for the deployment from both North Korea and Russia remain uncertain. Following an updated security pact between them in June, if one side is invaded by an armed state(s), “the other side shall provide military and other assistance with all means.” While Ukraine’s recent invasion of Russian territory in August could be invoked to justify this clause, the treaty itself has not yet been fully ratified by either legislative body. The Russian State Duma, the lower house, ratified the treaty on October 24, and passed it to the Federation Council, the upper house. Meanwhile, North Korea has not yet taken any action.
Intelligence information from Ukraine and South Korea cannot be completely overlooked, but uncertainties remain about the scope and impact of North Korean military personnel in the Russia-Ukraine war. Meanwhile, South Korea’s potential arms sales to Ukraine raise two significant concerns for the security of the Korean Peninsula.
Since late 2022, Russian officials, including President Vladimir Putin and Deputy Chairman of the Security Council Dmitry Medvedev, have implicitly declared South Korea’s direct lethal weapon provisions to Ukraine a red line, warning that it could lead Russia to provide significant military assistance to North Korea. Two years ago, at the Valdai International Discussion Club Meeting on October 27, 2022, Putin warned, “How would the Republic of Korea react if we resume cooperation with North Korea in this [military] area, Would it make you happy?” The following year, on April 19, Medvedev added that Russia could provide advanced weapons to North Korea. Their warnings imply that military assistance could include conventional and even nuclear-capable weapons and/or technologies.
Also, South Korea’s decision could heighten North Korea’s threat perception. North Korea’s recent claim of South Korean military drone intrusions into Pyongyang has escalated the tension between them. If South Korea were to send weapons to Ukraine, North Korea could view it as a hostile action meant to target North Korean troops specifically. Pyongyang is likely to increase its provocations on the Korean Peninsula as a response.
Instead of rushing into a decision on sending weapons to Ukraine, South Korea must engage in broader consultation with its allies and thoroughly reassess its intelligence information. By taking a measured, prudent approach, South Korea can avoid unintended consequences and escalating tensions on the Korean Peninsula.